

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.166  
13 February 1964  
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH MEETING

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 13 February 1964, at 10.30 a.m. DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION 1964

Chairman:

Mr. P. LIND

(Sweden)

64-05341

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO  
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. G. GHELEV  
Mr. D. TEHOV  
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON  
U SEIN BWA  
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS  
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB  
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC  
Mr. M. ZEMLA  
Mr. T. LAHODA  
Mr. J. BUCEK

Ethiopia:

Ato Abate AGEDE  
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU  
Mr. A.S. MEHTA  
Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO  
Mr. Manuel TELLO  
Miss Ofelia REYES RETANA

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT  
Mrs. H. CHLOND

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. E. GLASER  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU  
Mr. M. IONESCO

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND  
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. AHMED OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN  
Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER  
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS  
Mr. D.S. MACDONALD  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

ENDC/128

page 2

déployer le plus possible d'efforts à Genève afin de réaliser un contrôle sérieux et pratique des armes nucléaires et de parvenir à la conclusion d'accords sur le désarmement.

"Dans cette entreprise, le pire serait de rester dans la négative. Ce qu'il faut en premier c'est un esprit de franche coopération. Un tel esprit de coopération de la part de l'Union soviétique serait le bienvenu à Genève.

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The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the one hundred and sixty-sixth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. de CASTRO (Brazil)(translation from French): On behalf of my Government, I intend today to submit for the Committee's consideration a specific and practical suggestion on a subject which, although it may be classified under the heading of "collateral measures" in the system we have adopted, is nevertheless, in our opinion, of decisive importance in the formulation of the whole question of disarmament, and may to a large extent determine the success or failure of our work.

That is why I am taking the liberty of prefacing my specific suggestion with a few brief theoretical considerations which seem to us useful and even necessary for its full explanation. I do not think that this manner of introducing the subject -- that is to say, the approach to practical realities by way of theory -- will seem strange to the members of this Committee. The reason we are meeting here in this conference room, occupied with and preoccupied by the future of mankind, is that one day Albert Einstein, a researcher in so-called theoretical physics, by solving a certain equation endowed our generation with the power to make practical use of nuclear energy for good or evil. This proves that there is no essential difference between practice and theory, for the theory of today becomes the practice of tomorrow.

We are all convinced in theory that nowadays peace is an urgent necessity. Inside this room and outside it, this truth has been repeated thousands of times by hundreds of persons responsible for the destiny of the vast majority of the human race. We are all theoretically convinced, too, that disarmament is a condition sine qua non for achieving peace. But in practice everyone is not yet convinced that disarmament and peace mean the same thing as national security. The idea that national security and international peace depend on the accumulation of armaments and on the defensive and offensive power of each country has been so deeply rooted in our minds that it has seemed disgraceful to cast doubt on the Roman proverb Si vis pacem, para bellum -- "If you want peace, prepare for war".

(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

Fortunately, times have changed and have come to belie the ideas handed down to us by pre-atomic mankind. That is why, in our atomic era, the Chief of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. William Foster, was able to write the following in his annual report to his country's Congress:

(continued in English)

"The great dilemma for the world's modern nations is this: as military strength has steadily increased, national security has correspondingly diminished."

(continued in French)

Armed peace, established and maintained by mutual terror, does not and cannot bring real security. Mr. Noel-Baker, a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, stated in a speech made two years ago that disarmament is technically much simpler than any other method of national defence; and he might have added that it is also much more reliable and much cheaper.

If we admit that peace, security and disarmament are nowadays synonymous, that the interests of large, medium and small Powers coincide in this matter, and that present and future generations can no longer regard war as a means of solving any national or international problem, it remains for us to consider what measures can be taken, in a world which is still armed -- and armed as never before -- to transfer into reality what we have already accepted in theory, in order to eliminate war and armed insecurity once and for all.

We know that it is not easy to make rapid progress along this path, bristling as it is with mutual distrust, accumulated hatred and memories of past horrors. We also know that, although our main objective, the signature of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, can only be a long-term one, the great dangers that we have to face are short-term dangers, all the greater as the gap between the two military blocs grows wider. Hence the self-evident value of the collateral measures by which we attempt to bridge that gap, to harmonize apparently secondary interests, and to repair deficiencies, hoping in this way to reduce the explosive areas of world tension which threaten universal peace.

(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

But collateral measures should have another function, just as important as the one which is always being mentioned in this Committee. They should also prevent any future breaches that might divide the peoples of the world. They should prevent the continuance, in a disarmed world, of the insecurity and injustice which engender wars and the armaments race. In order that peace should really exist and should be consolidated, it is essential to secure the universal recognition, not only of the concept of collective political security based on disarmament, but of another concept which my country defends and proclaims in all international bodies: that of collective economic security. I think that one day we must have, side by side with the Council of political security of the United Nations, a council for the economic and social security of the world. The mortal struggles between ideological or political blocs must not be replaced, as a consequence of the disarmament process itself, by no less mortal struggles between the "haves" and the "have-nots", between the developed and the under-developed peoples of the world.

Since the earliest meetings of this Committee, the Brazilian delegation has stressed this aspect of the problem, which we realistically consider an essential prerequisite of the disarmament process. On 16 March 1962 our representative on this Committee, Mr. de San Thiago Dantas, stated his conviction that there was an aspect --

"... parallel consideration of which is essential if we are not to risk rendering a large number of proposals utopian ...

"In the absence of a plan for economic reconversion, disarmament may mean a disequilibrium with dangerous consequences for the armed nations themselves. It is encouraging to think that the cure for this disequilibrium is within our reach, and that it can provide an opportunity for substantial progress, not only for the armed nations, but for all the unarmed as well".

(ENDC/PV.3, pp. 7,8)

This idea which we uphold that the economic reconversion of the world is closely correlated with the disarmament process, to which it therefore constitutes an indispensable preliminary, leads us to give this point top priority among the collateral measures, as one of the concrete measures which, as Mr. Naszkowski said at our meeting of 6 February,

(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

"... might change, if implemented, the political climate of international relations, ease tension and facilitate agreement on a much wider scale." (ENLDC/PV.164, p. 17)

At the same meeting the representative of Czechoslovakia expressed views which coincide exactly with our own when he said:

"Our Committee also could make, in its own way, a contribution in this direction, if it ... appealed to all States to take similar steps.

"Of course we fully realize that the path of unilateral measures in the field of budgets has its limitations. A decision in principle could be secured by a formal agreement, for which all the prerequisites exist". (ibid., p.28)

But the Czechoslovak representative then added:

"We may presume that such an agreed reduction might be very much more radical than the unilateral measures which have been announced, and that its positive effect on the further development of the international situation would be much greater." (ibid., pp. 28,29)

Mr. Simovic concluded his remarks on this subject by mentioning that a significant reduction in military budgets --

"... would restrict the possibilities of any further rearmament and at the same time would release considerable material resources for the economic development of the countries concerned, as well as for increasing economic aid to developing countries." (ibid., p.29)

In this same connexion I should like to remind you once again that the scientists and technicians who met here at Geneva last year at the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less-developed Areas signed a declaration in which they stressed the urgent need to conclude a treaty of disarmament and to utilize the resources released from military budgets to strengthen the economic and social development of the world. As the first signatory of this document and on behalf of all those who signed it, I had the great privilege of presenting it to this Committee by handing it to the late Mr. Omar Loutfi, who was then the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. As you know, this declaration was included among the official documents of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations (A/C.1/891).



(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

Bearing in mind the wish often expressed in this Committee for the adoption of a more concrete working procedure, which would enable delegations to work on a written text, and not only upon ideas expressed on very broad lines, my delegation has prepared the following document, which I have asked the Secretariat to circulate as a working paper of the Committee<sup>1/</sup> and on the basis of which it may be possible to hold a detailed debate and perhaps to reach general agreement. Here is the text of the Brazilian proposal:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

"CONSIDERING the desire often reiterated by the General Assembly of the United Nations as well as by the large majority of those responsible for the conduct of human affairs that immediate and practical results be attained in the discussion of disarmament problems,

"NOTING WITH SATISFACTION the sustained interest shown by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the proposals submitted to that effect and the insistence of its recommendations that such proposals enter upon a stage of effective implementation with a view to responding to the manifest desire for peace and progress common to all the peoples of the world,

"CONSCIOUS of the tangible and beneficial changes which the international political climate has been undergoing since the signature of the Moscow treaty on the partial nuclear tests ban,

"INSPIRED by the General Assembly Resolutions 1931 (XVIII) and 1837 (XVII), the latter adopted under the heading 'Declaration on the Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources released by Disarmament', both of which acknowledge, inter alia, that the resources at present allotted to military purposes might be progressively channelled towards peaceful ends, thus greatly benefiting all countries by virtue of an improvement in the economic and social standards of their peoples,

"COGNIZANT of the necessity to initiate, on an international scale, appropriate steps towards the progressive conversion of an economy of war into an economy of peace in order to forestall the dangerous consequences that might arise from a non-planned suppression of military expenditures for both the countries having a centrally planned economy and those having a free enterprise system, in conformity with the conclusions arrived at by the Economic and Social Council embodied in its Resolution 982 (XXXVI), stemming from the studies made by a group of experts appointed in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1516 (XV),

(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

"HAVING IN MIND General Assembly resolution 1710 (XVI), which, upon establishing the 'Decade of the United Nations for Development', requested the submission of proposals related to the eventual utilization of resources released by disarmament in economic and social development programmes, particularly in the under-developed countries,

"CONVINCED that the reduction in the military expenditures of the Great Powers would be a decisive contribution towards enabling millions of human beings, in developing countries and in economically depressed areas of those countries already showing a high degree of industrialization alike to attain levels compatible with their legitimate aspirations,

"CONVINCED, further, that the struggle against misery in the world will encourage the economic development of the world as a whole, rendering possible the creation of new markets, of new and better opportunities for work, of a substantial increase in the production of goods in all countries and facilitating and intensifying the commercial exchanges between the various areas of the world,

"PERSUADED that the vast economic and social imbalance now prevailing in the world represents, through the social tensions it entails, a serious threat to international peace and security,

"TAKES NOTE with deep appreciation of the reductions in the military budgets already officially declared by the two main armed Powers -- the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America -- and of the proposals put forth with a view to effecting even more substantial cuts in the years to come,

"REQUESTS all Governments to endeavour to demonstrate by practical measures their desire for peace, by carrying out reductions of the same nature in their respective military budgets,

"RECOMMENDS the application of the resources thus released in projects leading to the conversion of an economy of war into an economy of peace and in projects aimed at developing economically and socially all regions and areas markedly affected by poverty and by under-development,

"STRONGLY RECOMMENDS that a sum not below 20% of the global value of the reductions in military budgets already effected or which will be effected in

(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

,the future by all countries be credited to an 'Industrial Conversion and Economic Development Fund', to be established at the earliest possible opportunity with the purpose of financing projects of the aforesaid scope to be implemented in the developing countries, due regard being given to an equitable geographical distribution,

"ESTABLISHES IMMEDIATELY and within the framework of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a working group composed of the representatives of the Powers which have already declared a reduction in their military budgets and in addition by the representatives of three other Powers to be appointed by the Conference, to study and make recommendations to the Committee, concerning the structure and the functioning of the Fund." This is the text which I have the honour to submit for your consideration.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I have listened with the greatest interest to the statement just made by Mr. de Castro, representative of Brazil. With his customary eloquence he dealt with a highly important subject which, I am sure, deserves the attention of all delegations. In replying to his statement, which my delegation intends to study in detail, I should like to confirm that we in Italy, in a genuine spirit of human solidarity, are and always have been greatly concerned with the problem of the social and economic advancement of developing peoples, and that we are aware of our responsibilities towards them. We would once again express the hope that the negotiations on disarmament will lead the world not only to peace, but also to general well-being.

I should like now in my turn to bring the modest contribution of the Italian delegation to the debate on collateral disarmament measures, which is the subject of today's meeting. It seems to me that the opening of this discussion has been especially promising. Hitherto, collateral measures have been treated rather as the poor relations of the Conference, since at past sessions only a small number of our meetings have been devoted to this subject. But now that all delegations, encouraged by the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, have evinced during the general debate a greater interest in this less spectacular but more realistic approach to the problem of disarmament, we may count on redoubled and unanimous efforts.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The Committee now has before it many proposals on collateral measures put forward both by Western and by Eastern delegations, and no doubt the non-aligned delegations will also wish to contribute their ideas and suggestions; at least we hope so. The large number of proposals is certainly a positive factor in itself. Nevertheless, in order to bring our task to a satisfactory conclusion, we must seek to establish a proper order of procedure. This problem is highly important since, in the Italian delegation's opinion, it is only by concentrating our attention on a few specific subjects to begin with, and then passing on to the others, that the Committee will be able to perform really useful and constructive work.

Our delegation has already expressed the hope that, in view of the co-operation that has been established between them, our two co-Chairmen will be able to reach agreement on a satisfactory plan of work. We know that contacts for this purpose are being maintained between the two co-Chairmen, so we have every reason to hope.

Meanwhile, I think it is our duty to co-operate in seeking a common course of action, and to express our points of view. It seems to me that we should choose a criterion to guide us through the vast amount of material that we have to examine and to determine our first objective. One perfectly self-evident fact has often been reiterated: that the first step is to halt the armaments race. Mr. Burns used the metaphor of a motor-car which must stop before going into reverse (ENDC/PV.158, p.11). That is a very effective illustration.

That being so, we believe that it is above all in the field of collateral measures that we should seek the means of stopping the armaments race. Collateral measures are for the most part preliminary measures. Several of them are aimed at preventing the dangerous developments which are possible in certain directions and at bringing about, with the re-establishment of mutual confidence, a favourable starting-point for the reduction and elimination of armaments. The Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), which is the first concerted collateral measure, is really nothing but a "standstill" agreement, since it relates to a qualitative and limited stoppage of the race for nuclear armaments. It seems to me that the idea on which the Moscow Treaty is based should be developed by applying it to similar and wider problems. Here we shall have to base ourselves on criteria of urgency and priority, first taking into account the sectors in which the dangers seem to be most acute and the needs most pressing.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

An agreement on non-dissemination would be a "freezing" measure, like the Moscow Treaty. It would in one way be a conservatory measure, and in another a limiting measure, the importance of which I think it unnecessary to stress again, since the Italian delegation's views are already well known.

At our meeting of 6 February Mr. Foster, the United States representative, gave us some very pertinent explanations of the United States views on non-dissemination (ENDC/pv.164, pp.5 et seq.) My delegation fully associates itself with those views. The measures contemplated in the United States proposals comprise progressive and ever-widening action which might include another specific "freezing" agreement, on the cessation of production of fissile materials for military uses. It seems clear that the mere adoption of these measures would circumscribe and reduce the nuclear danger. Some of the threatening possibilities of its expansion would be completely blocked.

Nevertheless, in the United States proposals (ENDC/120) taken as a whole the concept of freezing is carried much further. It is extended to strategic nuclear missiles. For the first time in this important sector of disarmament, it is proposed to take a preventive measure which would halt any subsequent quantitative or qualitative spread of these terrible weapons. This would not be a gesture or a unilateral and revocable example, but it would be a reciprocal, solemn and irreversible commitment.

Accordingly, if these three measures -- the freezing of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, the freezing of fissile materials for military uses, and the freezing of all strategic atomic missiles -- were carried out in addition to the measures which are the subject of the Moscow Treaty, the overall result would be a very substantial slowing down in the race for nuclear armaments and the creation of a most favourable atmosphere for further progress in disarmament.

Moreover, these measures would not be without financial repercussions. This morning Mr. de Castro again referred to the question of military budgets (supra, p.8) The blocking of certain expenditures would serve as a starting point for the solution of the problems with which the Brazilian representative is concerned. It seems to me that the closing of factories producing fissionable material for military purposes and for the development of strategic missiles, the most costly plants in the world, would result in savings and would represent a first step towards the total blocking and gradual reduction of military expenditure. It is quite conceivable that an

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

exchange of information on this matter between the two sides would open the way to a better reciprocal knowledge of budgetary problems and would thus facilitate the study of the reduction of military expenditure.

We are not forgetting that collateral measures must also conform with the agreed principles for disarmament negotiations (ENDC/5). All the freezing measures I have listed conform with these principles, so that agreements on the subject should meet with no obstacles in connexion either with verification or with maintaining the military balance. Of course the Italian delegation is not slavishly attached to these principles; we are prepared at all times to interpret them broadly and boldly, but it is obvious that guarantees are always necessary if we want to work in a practical and constructive way. I think that, where the freezing measures we have listed are concerned, these guarantees exist and can be easily verified and applied.

In conclusion, for all these reasons, the freezing measures in the broadest sense to which I have just referred seem to my delegation to be the most useful and promising direction for our Committee's work. Other freezing measures might also be contemplated, but let us start by freezing armaments in sectors where this would be most feasible, and where we have before us proposals which are already ripe for elaboration and for transformation into practical and positive agreements, with the co-operation of all delegations.

Of course, freezing measures are only a first step, but there is nothing to prevent us from exploring at the same time the possibility of the material elimination of certain armaments, as the Soviet delegation has suggested in the case of bomber aircraft (ENDC/123, p.5). This proposal has been only roughly outlined and we do not yet have enough information to evaluate its full scope. My delegation hopes that this idea will first be carefully studied by the two co-Chairmen and then put into shape with the co-operation of all delegations.

Before concluding, I should like to make one last general remark. It is possible that the intervention or co-operation of an impartial international body may be necessary for the immediate execution of the first agreed collateral measures, in order to ensure strict observance of the commitments undertaken before the international disarmament organization is set up. The United States delegation has proposed the intervention of the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify commitments in respect of fissile materials. That is an idea which deserves attention, for the Agency has a virtually unique technical competence. In the same connexion, however, in the case

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

of other subjects and other collateral measures on which agreement might be reached, I believe that our Committee, or a properly composed subsidiary organ of the Committee, could play a very useful practical role.

Of course, the Eighteen-Nation Committee is at present a negotiating body, but there is nothing to prevent it from assuming, by common accord, certain executive and supervisory functions with regard to any agreements which it may negotiate and conclude. The presence of many delegations of non-aligned countries and the system of two co-Chairmen would ensure the organic, balanced and beneficial functioning of the Committee, even in new spheres of action. In other words, I believe that the Eighteen-Nation Committee might assume, in the appropriate forms and in respect of certain disarmament agreements, the role of an interim disarmament body until the real international disarmament organization comes into being.

Some may find this idea premature. For my part, I dare to hope that the existing atmosphere will render possible the speedy conclusion of certain agreements on collateral measures. I am sure that, if we use the right methods and redouble our efforts, our hopes will not be disappointed.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): My delegation listened with great interest to the distinguished representative of Brazil, Ambassador de Castro, in his eloquent plea for economic conversion following disarmament. I can state that the United States Government is already actively studying the economic consequences which might follow disarmament. That is being done in our country by a high-level White House committee, and we hope that it will produce results, some of which can lead ultimately to the kind of assistance to which Mr. de Castro referred.

We would of course be pleased to see any nation decide to use more funds for the welfare of mankind and less for the acquisition of weapons of war; but we doubt whether this Committee should adopt declaratory exhortations which could not have like effect on all States concerned. We have always been in favour of an end to the arms race and a reallocation of the vast sums involved to the benefit of mankind. But concrete, verified disarmament agreements seem to us to be the best means to that end. We should welcome a reduction in the military budgets of all States.

But, as Mr. Khrushchev reminded us in his year-end message, there are many outstanding territorial and other disputes which create tensions around the world. Indeed, the distinguished delegate of India, Mr. Nehru, made it quite clear the other day that

(Mr. Foster, United States)

nations which are "exposed to threats of aggression", as he stated (ENDC/PV.162, p.14), and are militarily weaker than the great Powers cannot easily implement military budget reductions. We agree that one of our key objectives should be to reduce military budgets. We also agree that those who have the means to help should do so, and I think it is quite clear that the United States has been doing precisely that for a number of years and hopes to continue to do so. Of course, we shall study the proposed formulation put forward by Mr. de Castro (ENDC/126) and shall undoubtedly have other comments to make on it later.

I should also like to refer to the remarks made by the distinguished representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti. I think my fellow co-Chairman and I will give due heed to his plea that we attempt to agree on procedures which will further our activities more rapidly. I also agree with his remarks that collateral measures represent a way in which we can best advance at this moment; and it is the intention of the United States delegation to put forward such collateral measures as appear to us to hold greatest hope for that accomplishment.

In that connexion, today I should like to develop further the United States ideas on two related proposals which I have mentioned previously to this Conference. These are, first, a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons and, second, the transfer by the United States and the Soviet Union of agreed quantities of weapon - grade U-235 to purposes other than for use in nuclear weapons.

A halt in the production of fissionable materials for such use in nuclear weapons is an important element of stage I of the United States proposal for general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30). The transfer to non-weapon uses of agreed quantities of weapon - grade U-235 by the United States and the Soviet Union is also an important stage-I measure affecting nuclear weapons.

The United States delegation has stated previously to the Committee that the cut-off and transfer could be implemented as collateral measures in advance of agreement on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/PV.151, p.12). It is as collateral measures that I intend to discuss these proposals today.

I

We consider the cut-off and the transfer important proposals. The cut-off would limit the amount of fissionable materials available for use in nuclear weapons.



(Mr. Foster, United States)

As I indicated during our meeting of 31 January (ENDC/PV.162, p.16), the same philosophy underlies our proposals for a freeze and a cut-off -- the points 2 and 3 of President Johnson's message to the Conference (ENDC/120). The freeze would limit numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear vehicles. The cut-off would limit the amount of explosive materials available for nuclear weapons and the transfer would actually reduce this amount.

I wish to stress at the outset the flexibility with which the United States delegation would approach negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding the production cut-off and transfer. We are prepared to approach the problems involved in a number of different ways. We are prepared to accept a wide range of alternatives.

Practical steps which would restrict the availability of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons appear to us possible. These steps should, we believe, be taken in the immediate future.

## II

I should like now to develop more precisely the United States proposals.

Regarding the cut-off, the United States is willing to agree to either a complete halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons or a reciprocal plant-by-plant shut-down. This approach seems to embrace the entire range of possible methods of bringing a cut-off into effect. We are prepared to halt production all at once or over a period of time. We would welcome an indication from the Soviet delegation of the sort of approach which they would find acceptable.

Regarding the transfer, the United States position is similarly flexible. The proposal originally put forward by the United States called for the transfer to non-weapon uses of the same quantity of weapons-grade U-235 by both sides. We have, however, indicated our willingness to consider other ratios whereby the United States would transfer a larger amount than the Soviet Union.

This was reflected in an amendment of the United States treaty outline on 14 August 1963 (ENDC/30/Add.3). At that time the United States delegation indicated an example of the kind of arrangement we might agree upon. This might be for the United States to transfer an amount such as 60,000 kilograms if the Soviet Union would agree to transfer 40,000 kilograms (ENDC/PV.151, p.12). We are still flexible on the question of amounts of weapons-grade U-235 to be removed

(Mr. Foster, United States)

from availability for nuclear weapons. We would welcome and give serious consideration to any reasonable Soviet counter-proposal.

This proposal is not merely a gesture. Some figures illustrate its scope. As examples, the approximate monetary value of 60,000 kilograms of weapon-grade U-235 is \$720 million. If completely fissioned in explosions, 60,000 kilograms would release about 1,000 megatons, or one-third of a ton of TNT equivalent for every man, woman and child on earth. On the other hand, if the 60,000 kilograms were completely converted to electrical energy in nuclear power reactors, it would produce 370 billion kilowatt-hours, or somewhat more than one-third as much as the entire United States production of electrical energy in 1963. These figures give some idea of the dimensions of the United States proposal.

Now I should like to consider some of the possible methods of verifying the cut-off. One of the reasons why the United States delegation believes that this proposal is promising is because the inspection required can be limited in scope.

For example, inspection of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons would not be necessary.

The extent of inspection initially required would depend on whether the Soviet Union preferred a complete halt in the production of fissionable materials for weapons, or a reciprocal plant-by-plant shut-down.

If a complete production out-off were agreed upon, the International Atomic Energy Agency might monitor declared facilities for the production of fissionable material.

Those facilities declared to have been shut down would be inspected to make sure that no production of fissionable materials was taking place. Other declared facilities might continue to produce fissionable materials for peaceful purposes. These facilities and the produced materials would be monitored to ensure that no such product was diverted to the fabrication of nuclear weapons.

Each side would also need to have assurance that the other was not engaging in clandestine production at undeclared facilities. We believe that inspection to guard against this possibility could be carried out on a reciprocal basis. We also believe that a reciprocal system could be devised that would not be onerous.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

If, on the other hand, production were halted on a plant-by-plant basis by the United States and the Soviet Union, inspection would be even more limited at the outset. Only the plant or plants actually shut down would be inspected. The possibilities of International Atomic Energy Agency inspection of a plant-by-plant shut-down appear promising to us also, and we believe they should be carefully explored.

What we are proposing in this regard is a way of moving towards a complete cut-off. We would start with a plant-by-plant shut-down with plant-by-plant inspection. Such inspection could be carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are members of that international organization.

### III

The United States is already cutting back its production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes. We are shutting down four out of fourteen plutonium-producing reactors. Fourteen is the total number of such producing reactors in the United States. We are cutting back by 25 per cent the combined electrical usage of the gaseous diffusion plants producing weapon-grade U-235.

As I have previously announced to this Committee (ENDC/PV.164, p.9), the United States is prepared to permit international inspection of one of the plutonium reactors being shut down. This is to provide an example and a precedent.

However, there is a limit to the extent to which the United States can go in this direction alone. We hope for a measure of reciprocity on the part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union can decide for itself the size of the step it wishes to take. We should welcome the shut-down of one Soviet plant, a few or all.

Achievement of some measure of agreement would start both sides in the direction of freezing and reducing the amounts of explosive materials available in the world for nuclear weapons.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria wishes to dwell today on two of the collateral measures which, although they have been formulated differently, appear both in the Soviet Government memorandum (ENDC/123) and in President Johnson's message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee (ENDC/120).

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

I have in mind, first, the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons or, more precisely, the question of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. Everyone knows how much interest the United Nations General Assembly has **shown** in this problem over a number of years. The resolutions adopted by the United Nations on this question are also well known. The fact that our country has voted in favour of all the United Nations recommendations relating to the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is sufficient evidence of the Bulgarian Government's opinion on this question.

In his statement of 6 February the United States representative, Mr. Foster, referred to the concern shown by the late President Kennedy in connexion with the danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.164, p.6). We are well acquainted with the concern which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have been showing in this regard for many years. The repeated and insistent warnings of the socialist States concerning the great danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons are also well known. We may note with satisfaction that this threat is being more and more clearly realized by everybody; the logical consequence of this should be the recognition of the duty of all States to do everything in their power to avert this danger before it is too late.

In the situation which has come about, it would be possible to conclude not only that the question is ripe for solution, but also that all the prerequisites exist for its immediate and positive solution. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a serious obstacle has arisen in the path to an agreement, namely, the impossibility of finding a common language on the question whether all the nuclear Powers really want to bar the way to a further spread of nuclear weapons effectively, decisively and without any reservations, or whether, being guided by certain political and other considerations, some nuclear States are quite willing to leave "side doors" for supplying nuclear weapons to third States, while closing their eyes to the serious consequences that would arise for the cause of disarmament and universal peace.

We should like to ask some of the representatives of the Western Powers, before reproaching the delegations of the socialist countries with a renewal of "cold war" polemics, to ponder seriously on the warnings about the danger entailed in a possible supplying of nuclear weapons to the West German Bundeswehr.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

It is true that it would be at least far-fetched to see an attempt to renew the "cold war" in the discussion, the arguing, that is so intrinsic to a body which has been entrusted with the task of discussing disarmament questions and conducting negotiations on them. I think there is no need to prove that, if there had been an absolute identity of views on all the problems set before us, we should have reached agreement long ago and should not now be sitting here and searching for mutually-acceptable solutions. We are doing this because there are disagreements, which we do not consider to be insurmountable and which we wish to overcome. We argue because we think that in arguing we hope to find the correct solution to the question set before us.

Well, then, how does the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria regard the proposal concerning the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons? We understand this proposal in its literal sense: the States possessing nuclear arms will not try to supply them to other States, will not encourage or help other States in the fabrication of those weapons, nor will they allow any participation by other States in the control of those weapons. According to the sense of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on this question (A/RES/1665(XVI)) there is no doubt that it is intended against allowing third States, either directly or indirectly, to obtain access to nuclear weapons. In short, we think that the concept of the "non-dissemination of nuclear weapons" is abundantly clear and requires no explanation. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, the interpretation of the concept of "non-dissemination" can in no case be broadened.

Nevertheless, in analysing the proposals of the Soviet Government and of the Government of the United States in which the same concept of "non-dissemination of nuclear weapons" is used, we note substantial differences in their interpretations. Whereas the Soviet Government gives a clear, restrictive interpretation to this concept, the Government of the United States apparently considers that access by other States to nuclear weapons on a so-called "multi-national basis" is not a dissemination of those weapons.

We do not intend to argue about the content of individual concepts. But a very serious question is involved, which is fateful for the cause of peace and humanity. It must be one or the other: either we wish to come to an agreement on preventing the dissemination of nuclear weapons in any shape or form, or in practice there will be no prohibition of the dissemination of those weapons. There is no third way, and no one should have any illusion that such a way can be found by juggling with terms and circumventing the categorical resolutions of the United Nations.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Let us try to imagine how a treaty "on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons" would look in practice and what consequences would result from such a treaty in which -- as the United States side proposes -- only the prohibition to transfer nuclear weapons to the national possession of other States would be provided for. This means that nuclear weapons could be transferred to other, non-nuclear States for possession in a different way -- for instance, on a so-called multi-national basis. In that case could such a treaty be called "a treaty on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons"? It seems to us that it would be more correct to call it "a treaty for finding ways and means of disseminating nuclear weapons", contrary to all the resolutions of the United Nations and to all the declarations made by the nuclear States and by all the States within our Committee and outside it.

There is no doubt that our Committee cannot set as its aim the conclusion of of such an agreement on the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

In connexion with the question under consideration, it is not without interest to us to note the attitudes of the two German States towards the problem of nuclear weapons and, in general, towards the questions of disarmament and the maintenance of peace in Europe and throughout the world. There are unquestionable facts which nobody can refute and which cannot be hushed up.

The delegation of the Democratic Republic of Germany came here to inform the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee of a most important initiative -- a proposal that both German States should undertake not to seek access to nuclear weapons, to renounce once and for all any attempt to possess those weapons under any guise and to transform the territories of both Germanies into a zone free of nuclear weapons (ENDC/124). Unfortunately, not only has no similar proposal been made on the part of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, but, as we see, the Bonn Government has even refused to consider the proposal of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Germany.

Consequently there is a substantial difference in the behaviour of the Governments of the two German States. We do not intend at present to analyse the behaviour of those two Powers in detail. But the facts remain: on the one hand the Government of the Democratic Republic of Germany proposes to transform the whole of German territory into a zone of peace; on the other hand, no matter what

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

assurances we are given of the peace-loving intentions of the Bonn Government, that Government, without any doubt, is persistently and quite openly striving to obtain its own nuclear weapons; moreover, everything points to the fact that the NATO plans for the creation of a "multi-national force" are the result of the stubborn demand of West German political leaders to possess nuclear weapons and to obtain in the end control over them.

That behaviour of the Bonn Government should not surprise us. It has its own history. A few days after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany fifteen years ago, a correspondent of the Paris newspaper Le Monde asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France at that time, Mr. Robert Schuman, whether the question of the indirect participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO was being considered. The reply was as follows: "No, in no form -- either directly or indirectly. Nor is there any question of forming a German police."

At that time everybody still remembered the decisions of the Potsdam Conference, and the war crimes committed by Hitlerite Germany during the Second World War were still fresh in the memories of all peoples, particularly those of Europe. But, whereas to the east of the Elbe the remnants of German militarism and revanchism have been finally eliminated once and for all, the leaders of the Bonn Government have done and are doing everything in their power to refute Mr. Schuman. I do not want to trespass on your patience, but assertions that the most peace-loving intentions prevail in the Federal Republic of Germany and that the revanchists of Bonn have nothing in common with Hitlerite revanchism, compel me to quote some statements made by leading figures and institutions of that Power.

Thus, to begin with, the "Free Berlin" radio station expressed the following opinion:

"Remembering events of recent years, it becomes clear that the West has suffered defeats fraught with serious consequences not during the periods of tension, nor when it was on the brink of war, but in times of seeming tranquility, in the episodic relaxation of tension, during negotiations and talks. Always, when the threat to use missiles hangs over the world, we may sleep in peace, but when the representatives of the great Powers set out for the conference table, that is a reason for extreme concern and caution."

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Mr. Guttenberg, a deputy of the Christian Socialist Union, said:

"Nobody dares refuse us those types of weapons which decide, and which decide alone in these days, the outcome of war. I cannot imagine the Federal Republic of Germany without atomic weapons. We must make it quite clear to our allies that a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization would jeopardize the stability of the alliance with the Federal Republic."

Mr. Mattheus Walden, a West German journalist, asserted:

"The relaxation of tension, one of the most stupid, abstract and dangerous slogans of today, is growing and flourishing. Kennedy's peace strategy is the most stupid of the slogans. To capitulate in the cold war would be worse than carrying it on."

Mr. Reizner, a lecturer at the School of Political Science in Munich, likewise repeated the refrain:

"The thaw in East-West relations does not favour our aims. Our interests were always best served when the cold war was at its height."

Those are but a few of the statements made by those who create so-called "official public opinion" in the Federal Republic of Germany.

But perhaps the most responsible people in Bonn think differently? I shall take the risk of disappointing those who defend the "peace-loving intentions" of the Bonn Government, and shall take the liberty of giving a few more brief quotations. In November 1963 the Vice-President of the Bonn Bundestag, Dr. Jaeger, speaking before the Higher Military Academy of the West German Bundeswehr, stated:

"With the passing of time our partnership within the framework of NATO would be possible only if the monopolistic reservations in regard to nuclear weapons were removed."

The Minister of Defence of the Bonn Government, in an interview with a correspondent of the United Press International, declared that he --

"shares the opinion of Mr. Strauss on the necessity of arming the Bundeswehr with tactical nuclear weapons down to division level."

Further, in an interview with the correspondent of the journal Europe Mr. von Hassel said:



(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

"Undoubtedly our defence must be fully balanced on the basis of conventional and nuclear weapons."

Thus the reassurances which we have heard in the course of our debates that allegedly "the creation of multilateral defence forces within the framework of existing collective security arrangements would not result in additional States obtaining national control of nuclear weapons" (ENDC/PV.164, p.8) are unconvincing. As far as the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned, they are utterly groundless. We may note with satisfaction that in the West also this opinion is being held by more and more public figures and politicians, as well as by people who are well acquainted with the problem of nuclear armament. Thus, in his article "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma", Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, the well-known United States expert on military questions, wrote:

"... the multilateral force is apt to prove only an interim step and may turn out to be the easiest way of getting Germany into the nuclear business". (The Reporter, 28 March 1963, p.32)

We have heard still another argument in favour of arming Western Germany with nuclear weapons on a "multi-national" basis. That argument is approximately as follows: we must agree to the arming of the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons on a multi-national basis because otherwise in a few years' time it will be impossible to withstand the pressure of Western Germany to possess nuclear weapons under its own control.

That argument, as is quite evident, apart from anything else, completely reduces to nought the thesis of the alleged restrictive role of the Paris Agreements and the obligations formally assumed by Western Germany not to seek to arm the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. Evidently, attempts are being made to find some means of withstanding the pressure of Western Germany. It is considered that such a means has been found in the form of participation by the Federal Republic of Germany in a multilateral nuclear force.

At the same time competent people argue that along that path exactly the opposite results would be obtained. To us there seems to be something strange about the very logic of the assertion that the only means of stopping the German militarists' irrepressible striving to obtain nuclear arms of their own is the

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

path of a "multilateral nuclear force". On the one hand, official admissions are made that it will not be possible to withstand Bonn's pressure to obtain its own nuclear weapons; on the other hand, attempts are made to persuade us that this pressure will cease and the danger be avoided if Western Germany is included in a "multi-national nuclear force" -- in the maintenance of which, incidentally, it will participate, according to the plan, to the extent of 50 to 70 per cent of the expenditure of all the European members of NATO who have agreed to take part in the creation of that force.

As they say in such cases, comments are superfluous. The intention of Bonn to obtain nuclear weapons by one means or another is beyond doubt. Some of the Western countries are prepared to satisfy the West German military appetite. It is impossible to agree to this. That is how the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria understands and interprets the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, as well as the demands of the people and the interests of peace. We have no doubt that a qualitative and quantitative limitation of nuclear weapons in the hands of the great Powers which now possess them could be, in conjunction with other measures, an important step towards maintaining peace throughout the world.

The second question in the field of collateral measures on which I wish to dwell briefly today is that of creating denuclearized zones in various parts of the world -- a question which has a direct bearing on the problem of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

In recent years, the idea of creating denuclearized zones in various regions of the world as one of the effective measures for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has met with universal recognition and approval. We welcome, in particular, the fact that one of the main arguments of the opponents of that idea -- the objection that it is necessary to wait for a general agreement on disarmament before setting about regional agreements -- can now be considered to have dropped out altogether. The many concrete proposals for the creation of zones free of missiles and nuclear weapons in various parts of the world, as well as the discussions on this question at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, show that the obvious usefulness of implementing such a measure

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

is recognized. Such a measure would be a substantial contribution towards improving relations between States and improving the international climate and, as a result, towards facilitating the achievement of other more substantial agreements in the field of disarmament.

The creation of denuclearized zones would help in the most effective way to bring about the aforementioned results, particularly in those areas where the danger of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war is greatest, for instance, in Central Europe. The same applies to the Balkans and Mediterranean areas which are of particular interest to the People's Republic of Bulgaria. The idea of declaring the Balkans a denuclearized zone goes back several years. During that time the advocates of this idea in the Balkan countries have considerably increased in number. We note with great satisfaction in the memorandum of the Soviet Government of 28 January 1964 the confirmation that is is prepared "... to give an undertaking to respect the status of denuclearized zones wherever and whenever they are established." (ENDC/123, p.4)

The importance which the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches to the question of declaring the Balkans area a denuclearized zone was again confirmed in the statement made by the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/PV.1225, provisional, pp. 16 et seq.).

The Bulgarian delegation wishes to stress also at the present time that the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is prepared to start negotiations with the leaders of the countries concerned with a view to reaching an agreement on the creation of zones free of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Balkans. We believe that the situation and conditions are now more favourable than when this proposal was first put forward by the Soviet Government on 25 June 1959.

At present the prospects and possibilities of reaching a general agreement on this question are better. We should not let this moment slip by. An agreement on the creation of a denuclearized zone in the Balkans would strengthen the confidence which has grown up among the Balkan States. There would be great tranquillity in what was formerly one of the most turbulent areas of the world. Tension would to a great extent disappear in an area where considerable armed forces of the Powers adhering to the Warsaw Treaty and NATO are in direct contact.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Clearly-expressed agreement and an undertaking on the part of the Western nuclear Powers that they are prepared, after the example of the USSR, to assume an obligation to respect the status of a denuclearized zone in the Balkan area would undoubtedly play a decisive role in the implementation of this initiative, so important and useful for the cause of peace.

We are deeply convinced that public opinion in all Balkan countries, all Balkan peoples without exception, would welcome an agreement to transform the Balkans into a denuclearized zone as an important and decisive step towards maintaining and consolidating peace, as a true indication of the intentions of the Governments of the Balkan countries to contribute actively towards facilitating and speeding up the accomplishment of our main task -- the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Ato AGEDE (Ethiopia): I listened with great attention to the statements made this morning. Since we consider them important, we propose to study them very carefully; we hope to have the opportunity of commenting on them at some time in the future.

I should now like to say a few words by way of comment on the work of the Committee, and I should like to begin by thanking our co-Chairmen for the valuable explanations they have given us of some of the measures that have been submitted to this Committee by their Governments. I believe I am reflecting the opinion of the Committee when I say that those explanations and the additional information furnished to this Committee have not only been valuable but have also made it possible for each delegation to understand the importance of the proposals more clearly, to grasp the promises they offer, and to comprehend and appreciate the difficulties to be overcome before they can be translated into concrete and actual measures.

My delegation welcomes those clarifications on certain points of the measures that have been presented, and looks forward with interest to having the opportunity of following further the clarifications on all the remaining proposed measures. However, we deem it essential that, while attending to those clarifications, we may at the same time proceed with our work by considering in detail certain proposed measures without necessarily waiting to do so until clarification of all proposed measures has been given.

(Ato Agede, Ethiopia)

Turning to matters of substance, I should like to draw the Committee's attention to what I said during the general discussion when I indicated that, while our main task is to work towards reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament, we should at the same time proceed to examine the partial measures which offer a greater chance for reaching early agreement (ENDC/PV.162, pp.6,7). I must point out that this step has been dictated purely by practical considerations: so that the Committee at the present session should achieve some concrete measures to satisfy the high expectations of the people of the world.

However, since then we have had the benefit of discussing both the matter of substance and that of procedure in this Committee and outside. We have carefully examined the statements made by each delegation, and we have taken note of the explanations given on some of the proposed measures. It is in the light of this consideration that we wish to make the following comments.

It will be recalled that we indicated the importance which my delegation attaches to, among other measures, the measure designed to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons and that for reduction of military budgets (ibid.). At that time we refrained from commenting on some of the other measures, believing as we did -- and we still hold the same views -- that we can make an intelligent contribution to our work only after we have all the facts and, on the basis of those facts, we can weigh the merits and feasibility of each measure as accurately as possible. In the light of the clearer idea we have gained as a result of the fuller explanation given by the United States representative on the second point of his Government's proposal (ibid., pp.16 et seq.; ENDC/120), I should like to indicate that my delegation shares the opinions previously expressed by other representatives to the effect that the proposal is indeed an important one and that the Committee should give it early and serious consideration.

I should like to observe that the general desire to start our work with a consideration of measures regarded as offering the prospect of reaching a more rapid solution is dictated by a recognition that the Committee should produce at least some tangible results at the present session. However, in the light of our discussions in this Committee and after further reflection on the matter, I must confess that we are not entirely convinced that the easier way out will ultimately

(Ato Agede, Ethiopia)

be the best course of action to adopt if we are to achieve a final solution of the problem of disarmament. That is particularly true when we realize that the arms race is progressing at an ever-increasing pace, and when we read in the newspapers -- if we may take this as a reasonable guess regarding the actual state of things -- that the United States "over-kill" capacity has reached over 1,500 times, while that of the Soviet Union is reputed to be in the region of over 150 times. That is stated in The New York Times for 7 February 1964.

Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that the possibility that atom secrets may be communicated to many more countries is a real and immediate danger. We must realize that this is happening at a time when humanity is struggling to free itself -- in fact it is trying to ensure its very survival -- by elimination of this dreadful danger of destruction represented by the nuclear and thermonuclear monsters. In our opinion, it is not sufficient to resort to half-measures for the solution of this vital problem. We feel it is imperative that more substantial measures should be taken in the form of agreements on such matters as a comprehensive test ban, the curtailment of the further development and production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, the restriction of all fissionable materials and their transfer to peaceful uses only, and the adoption of measures to prevent the further spreading of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons to nations not possessing them at present.

We feel that agreement on these measures should be sought and should be implemented as early as possible. These measures, augmented by agreement to reduce military budgets consistent with national security requirements, the gradual destruction of existing strategic weapons, the creation of observation posts for the prevention of surprise attack, and agreements on the creation of atom-free zones -- these would, to my mind, if implemented, make some real and substantial contribution towards meaningful reduction of tension and would thus lead towards reaching an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

What is more, we believe that the implementation of these measures would help to release funds now irrationally employed for the purpose of destroying man and the spiritual and material gains he has painfully achieved in the course of centuries. These funds could and should be employed to such worthy and indispensable

(Atc Agede, Ethiopia)

causes as the eradication of such old and relentless enemies of man as poverty, hunger and disease. It is not difficult, I believe, to realize that the eradication of these evil forces is as vital for the future peace and progress of mankind as the attainment of disarmament.

Having said this, I must make it clear that my delegation is not unaware of the existence of some real and serious problems which prevent the rapid achievement of an early agreement on some of the aforementioned measures. If we were to put our finger on the main problem, we believe that it is represented by the lack of an agreement on the machinery that is required to ensure full compliance with decisions reached or agreements entered into on such important measures as would gravely affect the security of States. It must be admitted that important differences of view exist on both sides among the nuclear Powers. Those are differences in the philosophical concept and in the nature and scope of the measures to be applied -- and we are not trying here to minimize either the complexity of the matter or the differences.

It appears to us, however, that one thing is absolutely clear: unless a solution is found to the problem of verification and control, it would be unrealistic to believe that any really significant progress could be made, be it on the implementation of any of the proposed partial methods which have some real and substantial weight upon reduction of international tension, or be it on means of constituting meaningful steps leading towards disarmament. This appraisal stems from our serious concern about the lack so far of achieving an acceptable solution to the problems of control and verification.

In this connexion my delegation is encouraged to observe that this serious concern regarding the need to achieve some positive solutions on the questions of control and verification as early as possible is shared by some of the members of the Committee, as reflected in their statements during the general discussion at the present session.

Therefore we should like to urge the Committee through you, Mr. Chairman, to spare no effort in seeking an early solution to these all-important problems. This is essential, we feel, if we are to succeed in our task and discharge the heavy

(Ato Agedo, Ethiopia)

responsibility entrusted to us, not only by our respective Governments and people but also by the peoples of the world as expressed through their representatives at the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

We should like to reiterate once again that we are fully conscious that there are no easy solutions to these problems. We believe, however, that, given the existence of a common and overriding desire to achieve solutions -- and we have no doubt that there exists such a desire on all sides -- if a more intensive and extensive search for new ideas is made and if these ideas are applied to the solution of these problems, it is difficult to believe that the problems are impossible of solution. This is all the more so because it is difficult to believe that the human intelligence and ingenuity that have been successfully applied to splitting the atom, and are now engaged in the vast process of unlocking the secrets of nature by probing deep into the recesses of the universe, cannot be used equally to obtain a solution to the problems of verification and control.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today we intend to comment on one of the proposals contained in the memorandum of the Government of the USSR of 28 January (ENDC/123) -- the question of the reduction of military budgets.

We have listened with great interest to the statement made today by the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Castro, and we should like to note with satisfaction the decisive support which he gave on behalf of his Government to such a measure as the reduction of military budgets. As regards rendering assistance to the economic development of developing countries, I must stress that the Soviet Union is already rendering substantial economic assistance to the developing countries which greatly exceeds the sum which would result from the proposal made today by Mr. de Castro. Of course, a further substantial reduction of military budgets will increase the possibility of expanding such assistance to the developing countries.

Everyone is agreed on the necessity of putting an end to the armaments race, which in itself has a very negative influence on the political and economic situation of literally all the countries of the world. The most characteristic



(Mr. Tsarapkin, JSSR)

feature of the present armaments race is the colossal growth of military budgets. At the present time, more than \$120 milliard are being spent annually for military purposes. This sum is equivalent to one-half of the capital investments assigned to all sectors of the world economy. More than 20 million people in the flower of their youth are now serving in the armed forces of the various countries of the world, and over 100 million people are in one way or another devoting their strength and energy to preparations for war.

The military budgets of the Western Powers of NATO have reached immense proportions. The military budget of the United States, which amounted to \$13.5 milliard in 1949, has now grown more than four times greater. In 1963 it amounted to \$55 milliard. Over the same period the military budget of the United Kingdom grew from £779 million to £1,950 million. Moreover, a further increase in the military expenditures of the United Kingdom is planned for the next budgetary year. Military expenditures in the Federal Republic of Germany are increasing in a particularly rapid manner. During the past ten years they have grown more than three times greater. In 1963 the military expenditures of the Federal Republic of Germany amounted to 6.2 milliard West German marks, whereas this year they will exceed 20 milliard West German marks. At the present time, in the Federal Republic of Germany more money is being spent for military purposes than Hitler spent in the years when he was speeding up his preparations for unleashing the Second World War. The military expenditures of the Federal Republic of Germany amount to more than 34 per cent of the total budget of that country. In this respect West Germany is second only to the United States, and to no one else.

The **present** size of military budgets points to an absolutely abnormal state of affairs in international relations. Military budgets swallow up colossal resources and efforts of the peoples of both developed and developing countries, and are a heavy burden on the economies of States. Even the most economically powerful Western Power, the United States of America, is compelled to take into account the negative consequences for its economy resulting from the growth of military expenditures, and to look for ways and means to reduce them. This is shown by the recently-announced intention of the Government of the United States to reduce its military budget by approximately 2 per cent.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In order to bring the world situation back to normal, it is first of all essential to put an end to the unprecedented armaments race and growth of military budgets.

The Committee is faced with the task of taking the fullest possible advantage of the relaxation of international tension which has begun to appear, in order to solve questions aimed at putting an end to the armaments race, further decreasing international tension, and ensuring progress in agreeing on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. If we fail to make progress in these questions, if we let slip the favourable situation that has been brought about, and do not take advantage of it in the proper way, and if we lose through inertia the impulse given to the cause of disarmament by the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and by other well-known instruments aimed at limiting the armaments race and lessening international tension, that failure will inevitably entail a still greater intensification of the armaments race and an aggravation of the international situation, with all the consequences deriving therefrom which would be so dangerous for the future of all peoples.

Being anxious to speed up agreement on measures leading to the cessation or slowing down of the armaments race and to the relaxation of international tension, the Soviet Government has put forward a number of important proposals, which are contained in the memorandum submitted to the Committee on 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123). As one of the partial measures in the field of disarmament, the memorandum puts forward the question of reducing military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent.

In the memorandum submitted to the Committee it is pointed out that, taking the initiative in solving this question, the Soviet Union has decided on a unilateral reduction of its military budget for 1964 by 600 million roubles. I would remind you that in the Soviet Union the appropriations for defence expenditures for 1963 amounted to 13.9 milliard roubles. On the other hand, in the Soviet budget for 1964 the appropriations for expenditures for the defence of the Soviet Union stand at 13.3 milliard roubles, which amounts to 14.6 per cent of all expenditures of the budget, or a reduction of the total sum of military expenditures by 4.3 per cent in comparison with military expenditures in 1963.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The great importance of the problem of reducing military budgets has been pointed out here by many delegations -- by delegations of the socialist and non-aligned countries and delegations of the Western Powers. Many representatives have also drawn attention to the great significance of the policy of "mutual example" in solving the problem of reducing military budgets. This has been mentioned here by the representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, India, Burma, Nigeria, Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom.

In this connexion we should like to point out that the Soviet delegation fully associates itself with the wish expressed by the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, that his delegation would like to see --

"... this principle of reductions by mutual example extended to other areas of the disarmament problem". (ENDC/PV.161, p.6)

At the same time, we should like to point out that it would be a positive factor in improving the international situation, and a definite achievement in accomplishing the tasks confronting the Committee, if other States possessing considerable armaments, apart from the Soviet Union and the United States, would also follow the policy of "mutual example" in the matter of reducing military budgets. A widening of the circle of States taking the path of reducing military expenditures in accordance with this policy of "mutual example" would open up new and favourable prospects for substantial progress in the field of disarmament. Efforts by the Committee to promote the development of events in this direction would be an important contribution towards the implementation of practical disarmament measures.

While giving the policy of "mutual example" its due, we nevertheless agree with the ideas expressed by our Burmese and other colleagues to the effect that there are certain limits to the application of such a principle or such a policy, and that more radical measures are needed in the field of the reduction of military budgets. The representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, made the following comments on this question:

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

"... In this connexion, I should like to point out that, in the matter of budgetary reductions as in other matters, although we welcome the giving of reciprocal examples with enthusiasm, we would appreciate even more real international agreements such as the one on nuclear tests signed at Moscow, to which numerous other countries have acceded. We should like the disarmament process to be really irreversible and to be based on reciprocal, comprehensive and multilateral legal obligations". (ENDC/PV.160, p.31).

We note with satisfaction the great interest in the reduction of military budgets shown by the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, who welcomed the decision of the Government of the Soviet Union to reduce its military expenditures. The representative of Nigeria, with every justification, drew our attention to the fact that —

"... the vast sums appropriated for military purposes are still not only staggering but vastly out of proportion to requirements for peaceful times and to provisions for peaceful purposes not only for developing countries but also for the super-Powers themselves." (ENDC/PV.159, p.13)

In this connexion we should like to point out that, with total military expenditures amounting at present, as we have already indicated, to over \$120 milliard a year, even a 10 to 15 per cent reduction of military expenditures would entail far-reaching positive economic consequences. Such a reduction of budgets would result in a saving of \$12 - 18 milliard a year. The transfer of these resources to the development of national economies, to education and health would have a most favourable influence on the well-being of the peoples. A considerable proportion of the savings could undoubtedly be devoted to rendering technical assistance to the developing countries. Thus one can see quite clearly that implementation of the proposal for the reduction of military budgets would have great positive consequences of both an economic and a political nature for all countries and peoples of the world.

The adoption and implementation of the Soviet Union's proposal for the reduction of military budgets would precisely correspond to the task set by resolution 1931 (XVIII) of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly, on

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

conversion to peaceful needs of the resources released by disarmament, to which the representative of Nigeria referred (ENDC/PV.159, pp.12 et seq.) and which was circulated here at his request as a document of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/122).

In order to achieve an agreement on the reduction of military budgets it is necessary for States to have a real desire and willingness to take the path of disarmament. It seems to us that, in the comparatively favourable international situation which has come about, there is a possibility of solving this problem without introducing into this matter the various complicating elements which ensue from the statement made by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Thomas, at our meeting of 30 January, when he proposed the establishment of a working group to verify announced reductions in military budgets (ENDC/PV.161, p.18).

We should like to point out in this connexion that we do not share the approach to the solution of the problem of reducing military budgets as it was expressed by Mr. Thomas. We consider that measures in the field of disarmament carried out by way of unilateral declarations without international agreements cannot, of course, be subject to control and verification. The proposals for such verification sound particularly strange coming from the lips of the representative of a Government which has not yet announced its intention to reduce the military budget of its country and, so far as we know, does not even propose to curtail its military expenditures in the forthcoming budgetary year but, on the contrary, proposes to increase them.

During the lengthy negotiations on disarmament matters there has never yet arisen any question of verifying the measures carried out by States, not by way of an international agreement, but by way of unilateral declarations. The fact that reductions carried out by way of unilateral decisions stimulated by "mutual examples" are not subject to international control was also pointed out by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in her statement on 28 January, (ENDC/PV.160, p.24).

In connexion with the fact that the United Kingdom representative has raised the question of control over the reduction of military budgets, we should like to point out that we see no obstacles to considering that question and reaching agreement on it when there is a real basis for this, that is, when we are concerned

(Mr. Tsarapkin. USSR)

with an agreement on the reduction of military budgets in accordance with the aforementioned proposal of the Soviet Government (ENDC/123).

The measure proposed by the Soviet Union to reduce military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent has some important characteristics which distinguish it from other measures aimed at slowing down the armaments race and lessening international tension. First of all, it should be noted that a reduction of military expenditures would express the willingness of States to take the path of carrying out practical disarmament measures. A reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent, as the Soviet Union proposes, would affect everyone to the same extent, for all countries would reduce the size of their military undertakings in equal proportion.

It is obvious to everyone that it will be considerably easier and much quicker to reach agreement on such a measure as a reduction of the military budgets of States than on certain other measures in regard to which the Western Powers are putting forward objections, declaring that, in their opinion, such measures might lead to upsetting the existing balance of forces or might endanger their security. As regards such a measure as the reduction of military budgets, even these quite unfounded objections cannot be sustained, since each State would itself determine which components of its military machine should be reduced, and to what extent, in implementing an agreement to reduce military budgets. Therefore we propose that the Committee proceed to discuss the Soviet proposal to reduce the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent. We hope that the Committee will succeed in reaching agreement on this question more rapidly than on any other. That would be a new, concrete step towards slowing down the armaments race.

Discussion of the question of reducing military budgets will make it easy to determine the positions of States on disarmament questions. It would therefore be desirable to consider this question as the first item on the agenda of our Thursday meetings, which are devoted to the consideration of collateral measures contributing to the improvement of the international situation, as well as to agreement on disarmament.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

An agreement on the reduction of military budgets would undoubtedly be of great importance for speeding up the accomplishment of the tasks assigned to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We hope that the consideration of this question in the Committee will serve as a new impulse in the movement towards mutual understanding and the improvement of the international situation. That would also contribute towards the achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 166th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador P. Lind, Representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Brazil, Italy, United States, Bulgaria, Ethiopia and the Soviet Union.

"The delegation of Brazil tabled a working paper for an Agreement on the Application of Savings on Military Expenditures.<sup>1/</sup>

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 18 February 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

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<sup>1/</sup>Circulated as document ENDC/126